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IN THE SUPHE1·1C COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 
15921 
SANDERS HANCOCK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
On May 4, 1978, appellant, Sanders Hancock, was 
charged by way of an Information with exercising "unauthorized 
control over cash in an amount in excess of $1,000.00 
belonging to Bill Brown Realty with the intent to deprive 
him of the same" in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 
and 76-6-412 (1953), as amended (R.35). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOlVER COURT 
On May 9, 1978, appellant was tried on the above 
mentioned charge before a jury in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
J. Robert Bullock, presiding (R.l4-l6). At the conclusion 
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of the trial, appellant v12s founc1 guilty of th'' offense 
charged (R.l6), and sentenced to not le~s than one nor 
more than fifteen years in the Utah StJte Prison (R.l2), 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the decision of the 
lower court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 26, 1978, Bill Brown hired the 
appellant, Sanders Hancock, to manage an apartment 
building, the Moon River Apartments, owned exclusive~ 
by Mr. Brown (T.70). Appellant's duties were those cl 
general management which included the collection of 
c."')::.;3it and rent monies and the requirement that the 
appellant turn over these monies to Mr. Brown or his 
bookkeeper, Billie Brinkerhoff, within 24 hours of 
collection (T. 71) • Within a day or two of the signing 
of the employment contract, the appellant occupied an 
apartment within the complex and began his duties. 
At trial r1r. Brmm testified that the a??ellar· 
performed satisfactorily during the month of February, 
but during the early part of April his bookkeeper notif 
him that the rents were s lmv in coming in (T. 7 2) . Nr. 
Brown then contacted the appellant and questioned him 
about the collection of the rent. The appellant promio· 
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Mr. Brown that he would bring the rent and deposit monies 
to him by 10:00 a.m. the next day (T.72). 
The next day the appellant failed to appear, 
but a friend of appellant's, Sam Ungricht, arrived at 
Mr. Brown's office and informed him that the appellant 
had taken substantial rent monies and left for Las Vegas 
(T. 7 3). Mr. Brmvn then contacted the Provo City Police 
Department and filed a complaint initiating these 
proceedings (T.73). Subsequently, the appellant was 
arrested in Las Vegas, the police finding substantial amounts 
of cash and a check to the Moon River Apartments on his 
person (T.l72). 
At trial the State put on evidence which established 
that the appellant had told at least ten apartment renters 
to make their rent or deposit checks payable to him. 
Appellant variously told the renters to make checks 
payable to him because (1) he was a co-owner, with Mr. 
Brown, of the complex, or (2) Mr. Brown would not accept 
out-of-state checks; therefore necessitating payment to 
the appellant who in turn would make out a personal check 
to Mr. Brown on behalf of the renters. 
The following renters testified at trial as to 
th0 payments made by them to the appellant: 
-3-
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Ira J. Ghaemi gilve app~llant a check ma~e 
payable to appellant on April 4, 1978, for $80.00 
for a deposit on one of the apartments (T.lO). 
Hamid-Reza-Jafari gave the appellant a check 
for $149.50 on April 8, 1978, made payable to appellant, 
for rental of an apartment unit (T.l5). 
Steven Van Ausdal gave the appellant $80.00 
for a deposit on ~1arch 9, 1978, and $165.00 for rent on 
March 22, 1978 (T.l9). 
Mohammad Sabbaghi paid appellant $80.00 for 
a deposit on a unit and $190.00 for rent on April 6, 
l973, both by check (T.23). 
Sally Jean Casper gave appellant $80.00 in ca~ 
as a deposit on March 25, 1978, and another $100.00 
for rent on April l, 1978 (T.28). 
Elisha Crandall paid appellant $80.00 by checl 
for a deposit on March 21, 1978 (T.32). 
Harriet N. Tibbs paid appellant $64.3n, cash, 
for rent on April 4, 1978 (T.39). 
Lisa Snelders paid $157.61 to appellant for 
rent and deposit on March 19, 1978 (T.43). 
Sherry Cloward testified that on March 18, 1978, 
-4-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
she gave the appellant $155.04 for rent (T.50). 
Finally, Glen Smith stated that he paid $80.00, 
cash, for a deposit on March 25, 1978, and $195.00 for 
rent on March 31, 1978, to appellant (T.52,53). 
In regard to each of the foregoing witnesses, 
the State produced either a cancelled check made payable 
to the appellant or a receipt for cash from the appellant. 
Mrs. Billie Brinkerhoff, Bill Brown's bookkeeper, testified 
that she never received any of the monies referred to 
above for deposit or rental of units at the Moon River 
Apartments (T.58-67). 
Following the introduction of this evidence and 
at the conclusion of the appellant's trial, he was found 
guilty of the crime charged. This appeal follows. 
ARGUHENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO TIMELY OBJECT AT 
TRIAL TO THE CHALLENGED JURY INSTRUCTION 
NOH PREVENTS HIM FROM CLAIMING ERROR. 
By way of this appeal, appellant claims error 
was committed by the lower court when it instructed the 
jury as to the essential elements of the crime charged. 
Appellant claims that the elements of the crime, as 
outlined by the court in Instruction No. 6 (R.22), were 
not complete in that they did not include the requirement 
-5-
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that the successive thefts rt:>sult<cc1 frorn "one sinqlc 
incriminating impulse or intent." 
Respondent asserts that the appellant's failure 
to timely object to the jury instructions now pre~ludes 
him from raising the supposed error on appeal. 
Regarding jury instructions and objections 
thereto, Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provide, 
in pertinent part: 
"If the instructions are to be 
given in writing, all objections 
thereto must be made before the 
instructions are given to the jury; 
otherwise, objections may be made 
to the instructions after they are 
given to the jury, but before the 
jury retires to consider its verdict. 
No party may assign as error the 
giving or the failure to give an 
instruction unless he objects 
thereto. In objecting to the giving 
of an instruction, a party must state 
distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the grounds for his 
objection. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing requirement, the appellate 
court, in its discretion and in the 
interests of justice may review the 
giving or failure to give an instruc-
tion. Opportunity shall be given to 
make objections, and they shall be 
made, out of the hearing of the jury." 
Thus, the general rule stated in Rule 51 is 
that a party must object at the time the instructions 
are offered in order to preserve the error for 
consideration on appeal. Respondent notes that when 
asked if he excepted to any part or portion of the 
jury instructions appellant's counsel responded that~ 
-6-
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would not object to any portion thereof (T.l85). 
Although Rule 51 contains a limitation on 
the above stated general rule requiring a timely 
appeal, this Court has consistently construed the 
rule narrowly so as to require a timely objection 
to an instruction before it will consider the alleged 
error on appeal. For example, in State v. Logan, 
563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977), the Court found that the 
error claimed by the defendant regarding the jury 
instructions was without merit, but stated that even 
if it had found otherwise the "appellant still could 
not prevail in this case for the record shows that he 
failed to object at the time the instructions were 
given, and ordinarily the failure to make a timely 
objection prohibits him from raising the point on 
appeal." 563 P.2d at 813. 
The reasoning behind this strict application 
of Rule 51 is stated in State v. Kazda, 545 P.2d 190 
(Utah 1976). The Kazda Court first notes th0 case of 
State v. Cabo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936), as 
providing an exception to Rule 51, but then states, 
concerning the general rule and the Cabo exception, 
the foll01·1ing: 
-7-
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"There is an important purrosc 
to be served by the rule requiring 
that objections be made to the 
instructions. It gives an 
opportunity for the court to correct, 
or to fill in any inadequacy in the 
instructions, so that the jury may 
consider the case on a proper basis. 
In order to accomplish that purpose, 
the rule should be adhered to. 
Accordingly, the standard rule is 
that when a party fails to make a 
proper objection to an erroneous 
instruction, or to present to the 
court a proper request to supply any 
claimed deficiency in the instructions, 
he is thereafter precluded from 
contending error. The Cabo case 
involved a homicide in which tlw 
appellate court appeared to be 
convinced that an injustice had 
resulted. Accordingly, it noted 
such an exception. But the exception 
is applied only rarely where there 
appears to be a substantial likelihood 
that an injustice has resulted. Then 
and then only will the failure to 
comply with the requirements of the 
rule be excused. No such circumstance 
appears to exist here." 545 P.2d at 
194, 195. 
Thus, this Court made it clear in Ko7da that a 
timely objection is a prerequisite to appell~te review 
of a jury instruction unless appellant contend~; and all 
the circumstances exist that substantial injustice has 
resulted from the supposed defective jury instructions. 
In this matter appellant does not contend nor 
does he set forth any facts which tend to show that 
-8-
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in jus c icc, rcc:oul ted from the <Jiving of the challenged 
jury instruction in the trial court. Because appellant 
failed to timely object to the challenged jury instruction 
and because no injustice has resulted therefrom, 
respondent avers that this Court should give effect 
to Rule 51 and a substantial body of case law which 
would preclude appellant from raising this question 
on appeal. State v. Kitchen, 564 P.2d 760 (Utah 1977); 
State v. Blea, 20 Utah 2d 133, 434 P.2d 446, 25 ALR3d 
1113 (1967); State v. Myers, 15 Utah 2d 130, 388 P.2d 
801 (1964); State v. Rowley, 15 Utah 2d 4, 386 P.2d 126 
(1963). 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO RAISE THE QUESTION 
OF THE CONTINUITY OF THE OFFENSE IN THE 
TRIAL COURT PRECLUDES HIM FROM RAISING THIS 
QUESTION ON APPEAL. 
Appellant argues that the trial court erred 
when it did not instruct the jury that when a charge 
results from a series of takings, in order for the 
separate acts to be aggregated into a single offense, 
they must all result from "one single incriminating 
impulse or intent." 
-9-
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Respondent again notes, as staled in PGint 
r of this brief, that appellant failed to request the 
court to instruct the jury as to this issue. Responde~ 
further notes that the appellant at no time durin~ the 
course of his trial raised the issue of one continuous 
offense or transaction with the charge of grand lareen,·. 
The record in this matter does not reveal any objection, 
exception or mention by appellant of the issue he now 
presses on appeal. Thus, appellant raises this issue 
for the first time on appeal. For this Court to conside. 
appellant's argument on appeal, where he has failed to 
raise and preserve it at trial, would contravene the 
intent of several previous decisions prohibiting 
examination of an issue raised for the first time on 
appeal. Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 465 P.2d 
343 (1970); State v. Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d 174, 
4 0 6 p. 2d 912 ( 19 6 5) • 
A case in point is State v. Allen, 59 N.H. 139, 
280 P.2d 298 (1955), where the defendant had been 
convicted of one count of theft from the person for 
stealing both vodka and cash. The vodka vias taken 
from the victim early in the evening, but the defendant 
returned later that night to steal the cash. The Supr~ 
Court of New Mexico concluded that the evidence was not 
-10-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
clear as tu whether the acts resulted from a single, 
S'lstai_necl, criminal impulse. It stated that this 
was a question for the jury's determination, but held 
the defendant's failure to raise the question at the 
trial level would preclude the Court from examining the 
issue on appeal. The court, therefore, felt constrained 
to affirm the decision of the lower court. 280 P.2d 
at 299. 
In State v. Gibson, 37 Utah 330, 108 Pac. 349 
(1910), a defendant was convicted of grand larceny for 
embezzling some $235.60 from the Theater Publishing 
Company over the course of 38 days. The statute in 
force at the time made an offense grand larceny if the 
amount taken exceeded $50. The largest single sum 
embezzled by defendant Gibson was $48.60. The defendant 
requested an instruction to the effect that because the 
defendant was not found with more than $50 in his 
possession at any one time, only a lesser charge of 
petit larceny could be found. This Court affirmed the 
trial court's refusal to give such an instruction, 
stating: 
"We think no error was committed 
in the ruling. The case is not like 
that argued to us by appellant where 
the successive larcenies, each complete 
and distinct, did not constitute one 
-11-
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continuous transaction; or \vh<'l-c· 
propert:ies belonging to different 
persons located at different pl~ces 
were purloined, and where each 
asportation constituted a separate 
and distinct offense •.• But it is one 
of embezzlement 'committed by a 
series of connected transactions 
from day to day' ••• and shown to be a 
'continuous offense committed by a 
trusted servant by means of a series 
of connected transactions; and in such 
case a charge of embezzlement on a 
certain date will cover and admit eviden~ 
of the whole' ••. and is one constituting 
'in fact and in law a single embezzlement' 
••• and where 'the one substantive charge 
of embezzleme:1t was support.ed by proof 
of the receipt at different timc·s of 
the amount' the appellant 'was charged 
to have embezzled and one convPrsion of 
the whole.' (Citation omitted.)" 37 
Utah at 332-333. 
~he Gibson Court found no requirement that a series of 
acts must result from "one single incriminating impulse 
or intent." Moreover, in State v. McCarthy, 25 Utah~ 
425, 483 P.2d 890 (1971), this Court again found no 
affirmative duty on the part of the trial ccn11·t to 
instruct the jury on the "one continuous offense theory.' 
In McCarthy, two individuals were a?prehended stealing 
hams, one being in possession of nineteen hams, defendan' 
McCarthy having only four. McCarthy was convicted of 
attempted grand larceny despite the fact that the fom 
hams would not exceed the statutory $50 requirement. 
-12-
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In clcio i tion to finding that a lesser included offense 
instruction was WQived by a failure to request it, 
the Court stQted: 
"In the circumstances shown, 
despite the defendant's hopeful 
conjecture and urgence, we see 
no basis upon which it could 
reasonably be believed that this 
was a segmented transaction in 
which there was an attempt to 
steal the four hams separately 
and thus make the offense petty 
larceny." Id. at 891. 
Other states have also refused to find an affirmative 
duty of the trial court to submit instructions under 
similar fact situations. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 
30 Ala.App. 27, 200 So. 630, cert. den. 200 So. 634 (1941); 
McKnight v. State, 134 Tex.Crim.Rep. 373, 115 S.W.2d 
636 (1938); State v. Martin, 82 U.C. 672 (1880). See, 
generally, 136 ALR 949, 53 ALR3d 398. 
Respondent submits that the finding of this 
Court in McCarthy, supra, should be controlling in the 
instant case. There is no reasonable basis suggesting 
appellant's actions were segmented. All monies were 
enbezzled from the same employer, all were generated from 
the same apartment complex, and the entire embezzlement 
occurred within a short period of time. Therefore, 
-13-
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there was no reasonable basis for Clil ins true tion uncl.2 r 
the facts presented. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant failed to raise his theory of a 
"single, sustained, criminal impuse" at trial. 
Respondent had no opportunity to address the issue 
or put on evidence establishing such an impulse. 
Furthermore, the trial court had no opportunity to 
rule on the merits of such a defense. 
Appellant also failed to object to the court's 
instructions to the jury regarding the elements of the 
crime. Appellant clearly stated that he had no 
objections to the instructions given by the trial court. 
Respondent asserts that to allow the appella~ 
to raise this issue for full review by this Court on ~~ 
would be contrary to all notions of fairness, judicial 
economy and appellate procedure. Additionally, such 
consideration would be contrary to substantial 
authorities. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney Cenerc-tl 
CRJ\IG L. BARLOIJ 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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